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Latent Angst, Disclosure, and Attunement:
On Heidegger's Grounding of Falling in
Fleeing
Colin Bodayle

I

In Being and Time, Heidegger claims that even when the
feeling of angst is not experienced it remains latent. Fear,
he maintains, is simply inauthentic angst. Likewise, he
claims that the fact that we “fall” into the world, are fascinated by it, define ourselves in terms of it, and care about
our place within it is a manifestation of “fleeing” from ourselves
in response to angst. While some commentators have not seen
these claims as problematic,1 why they are justified is not readily
apparent, leading some to reject or dispute the grounding of fear
in angst and the argument that falling and entanglement are
modes of fleeing.2 In the following, I show how these claims are
justified by Heidegger's phenomenological method and why
they are best understood in connection with the concepts of attunement, understanding, and disclosure.
Attunement, Understanding, and Interpretation
Who but the person asked can authoritatively answer the
question “how are you?” Admittedly, etiquette dictates that we
are always “fine,” yet we possess the capacity to answering such
a question honestly, also. We answer to indicate the kind of
mood we are in. For Heidegger, this is philosophically signifi-
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cant. He writes:
One possibility of being for Da-sein is to give ontic
“information” about itself as a being. Such information is
possible only in the disclosedness belonging to Da-sein
which is based on attunement and understanding.
(Heidegger 1996, 172[184])3
What this means is that our ability to give information about
our mood implies we understand moods, meaning the conditions for the possibility of moods must be given in such a way
that allows us to access the spectrum of possible emotional states
a priori. Also, moods determine our being so that we are not always aware of what mood we are in until asked. Heidegger insists we are always in a mood, whether we experience it explicitly or not, and he terms the particular determination of our being by our mood Befindlichkeit, which literally means “how-youare-ness” (although I have chosen to render it as “attunement”).
Thus, Heidegger, following Kierkegaard,4 can phenomenologically inquire into moods by means of a transcendental argument,
heading into a territory the philosophical tradition hitherto dismissed or confined to the purview of aesthetics and literature.5
To understand the significance of this mode of inquiry, we
should first make sure we understand Heidegger's phenomenological method.
Heidegger's phenomenology rests on the “ontological difference” between beings and Being. “Beings,” that is, what we are
aware of in perception, are understood on the basis of “Being,”
that is, the a priori conditions for the possibility of encountering
any beings whatsoever as meaningful.6 The term “ontic” corresponds to “beings” and “ontological” corresponds to “Being.”
“Being” represents the transcendental, i.e. the conditions for the
possibility of beings as such, notions familiar from Kant and
Husserl. What is unique about Heidegger's approach is that Kant
and Husserl deal with problems such as the conditions for the
possibility of arithmetic, the apperception of a die as three di-
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mensional, or the logical foundation of the ego, while Heidegger
deals with problems connected to lived, everyday experience,
such as the conditions for understanding how to swing a hammer, integrate into a social group, or recognize a car's turn indicator while driving.7 In any experience of beings, certain information must be disclosed to our understanding non-thematically
and a priori. “Disclosed does not, as such, mean to be known,”
though (Heidegger 1996, 127). Juxtaposed to the Kantian
“categories” that comprise the conditions for the possibility of
representations and rational judgments about them are the Heideggerian “existentials” that comprise the conditions for the possibility of our existence in the world as such (being-in-the-world)
and the particular “existentiells” or actualizations of the possibilities granted to us (Heidegger 1996, 42[44-45]). The disclosed
are what we bring with us to a specific experience implicitly.
Following this method, “mood” ontically indicates an existentiell of what is present in one’s existential “attunement” and
ontologically determines what is always present as a mood,
whether one explicitly grasps what mood one is in or not. For
instance, if one is in a bad mood one’s attention would be directed ontically to the mood itself or causes such as the weather
or one’s fatigue. However, our attunements show the meaning
of our moods to be the following: First, moods disclose the circumstances of each of our “selves” [Dasein] in our being
“there” [da] as a burden in need of alleviation. Thus, being-there
as a burden is fundamental to every attunement. As it is, we are
born “thrown” into our lives such that we must bear the weight
of our Being, even if we blame our moods on things outside of
ourselves.
This constitutes the second feature of attunement: moods
seem to come from the world itself—our relationships, jobs, or
activities—and bad moods sometimes seem to carry the entire
world with them. At other times, moods seem to cut off the rest
of the world and direct us to a single matter of concern. Phenomenologically, this entails that we “turn” away from consciousness of our burdensome being-there towards the world.
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Heidegger calls this turning towards the world “falling.” This
third feature of attunement reveals that we fundamentally exist
in such a way that the world “matters” to us such that it can affect our mood, instead of just floating by as thought it were a
meaningless rush of color, light, and sound. Things can be fearsome, lovely, sentimental, or dreary. Attunement means our
moods connect us a priori to the world, in such a way that they
disclose our being-there, our “falling” into the world, and that
things we encounter necessarily “matter” to us in an affective
way (Heidegger 1996, 126-131[134-141]).
Alongside attunement is always an understanding which is
not always explicit. It includes what is circumspectively8 disclosed
to us as well as that which is explicitly apparent. Additionally, it
can disclose our attunement to us, alongside all of the possibilities contained therein. For instance, Heidegger writes of experiencing fear:
Circumspection sees what is fearsome because it is in the
attunement of fear. As a dormant possibility of attuned
being-in-the-world, fearing, “fearfulness” has already
disclosed the world with regard to the fact that something like a fearful thing can draw near to us from this
fearfulness. (Heidegger 1996, 132[141])
We can become terrified at any time, which means that the
possibility of the fearsome is disclosed to us. Interpretation is an
act by which it is possible to make one’s understanding explicit
by allowing a concept or symbol to stand “as” one’s experience
or attunement. Sometimes what is disclosed is interpreted as
something else and “covered up” by language so that it becomes
trivialized.9 The purpose of Heidegger's phenomenology is to
rediscover such disclosures and uncover them.
In order to discuss Heidegger's analysis of angst, we should
first understand the purpose of his inquiry. Everyday human
dealings and our various attunements, entangle us constantly in
the world. Furthermore, everything that matters to us in every-
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dayness seems to involve a kind of running away from ourselves
and into the world. We then interpret ourselves in terms of our
attachments to it— e.g. our jobs, what we do, and the kind of
people we think we fit in with. We no longer see ourselves as
separate entities. Heidegger's goal is to demonstrate ontologically (that is, in a way that demonstrates the meaning) that falling and entanglement in the world are modes of fleeing from
ones self. The direction of motion (away) is apparent, but this
merely ontically describes falling as fleeing. This interpretation
of falling can only be ontologically significant if we explain the
significance of fleeing’s direction. Because of the close connection between attunement and understanding, particular attunements strike close to relevant ontological data, disclosing it, and
allowing us to interpret it. Angst, specifically, offers a way to
approach the phenomenon of falling, and can thus disclose its
character. This is because angst represents an inability to fall, as
will be demonstrated.
Attuning to Angst
Because of the way attunement and understanding operate,
Heidegger must merely demonstrate that the feeling of angst is
possible in order to illustrate its character. He can because our
understanding discloses these moods as possible for us. It seems
that we are capable of taking on the perspective of someone experiencing an attunement prior to exposure to that mood. When
we say “I can imagine how she feels,” we are saying that we
know how the world must look from within her attunement. In
literature we read about all kinds of situations that we have not
undergone personally, and yet we can understand what the
character is feeling by imagining that we are there in his shoes,
that we share his attachments to the world. We “find ourselves”
there and understand what mood he must be in. That the understandings disclosed in every particular attunement are ontologically determined a priori merely means that we have the ability
to empathize with any attunement. Therefore, if Heidegger’s ar-
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gument strikes deep within us so that we feel angst when we
contemplate it, then he will have sufficiently demonstrated the
phenomenon to us.10
Ich habe Angst literally means “I have fear” in German, but
Heidegger is following Kierkegaard by qualifying its use.11 Heidegger distinguishes these attunements from each other because
fear ontically “turns away” from what threatens it and flees and
is “about” the thing it flees from. Angst, on the other hand, is not
about innerworldly beings. Instead, Dasein wishes to flee itself.
“That about which one has Angst is being in the world as
such” (Heidegger 1996, 174[186]). Angst finds the whole prospect of being-in-the-world-as-such overwhelming and terrifying,
which means that angst does not have a specific object within the
world, nor is angst afraid of a specific possibility in the future. It
is afraid of possibility as such. “What Angst is about is completely indefinite” (Heidegger 1996, 174[186]). In the grip of
angst, we are overwhelmed by the task of living.
Nothing of that which is at hand and objectively present
within the world functions as what angst is about. The
totality of relevance discovered within the world of
things at hand and objectively present is completely without importance. It collapses. The world has the character
of complete insignificance. In Angst we do not even encounter this or that thing, which, as threatening, could be
relevant. (Heidegger 1996, 174[186])
Additionally, angst has a spatial component. Unlike fear, its
object does not approach from afar—what is threatening is
“nowhere,” which does not mean nothing; rather, “region in
general lies therein, and disclosedness of the world in general for
essentially spatial being-in” (Heidegger 1996, 174[186]). If we
recall Heidegger's description of spatiality, we will remember
that Dasein does not move from point A to B as if it were moving
across Newtonian space, but rather “de-distances” itself by moving a part of the world closer to it. Insofar as all possibilities
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(including the possibility of de-distancing) terrify Dasein as
such, angst is, as it were, simultaneously claustrophobia and
agoraphobia—one feels trapped by the infinite and overwhelmed by the openness of one’s confines. “It is so near that it
is oppressive and stifles one's breath—yet it is nowhere” (Heidegger 1996, 174[186]). For one with angst, things
within the world, possible spatial directions, and the interest that
they used to spark has faded. “What oppresses us is not this or
that, nor is it everything objectively present together as a sum,
but the possibility of things-at-hand in general, that is, the world
itself” (Heidegger 1996, 175[187]).
Thus, Heidegger says that when we say “it was really nothing,” we get at the ontic nature of what angst is about; that is, it
contains neither the ontic sum of every possible being nor a particular being. This nothing of the sum total is not nonexistent,
but it is a nothing because angst has skipped over all things and
advanced to the condition of their possibility—the world. It is
anxious about existing in the world in general (Heidegger 2008,
101). Angst renders us speechless. We cannot say anything about
what ails us, because it does not appear against the background
of the world we live in. Instead, it is our existence within the
world as such that we find so frightening. We cannot put it into
the context of our lives because it lies outside of and scaffolds
that context. In passing moments of depression as in angst,12 one
is often prone to wish to break the silence in one’s mind by
“changing the topic” to something utterable or even by speaking
under one’s breath.
Angst as Disclosure: World as World, Individualized Possibility
as Such, and Unheimlichkeit
So where do we find ourselves when we are attuned to
angst? Recall that what is disclosed is not necessarily conceptualized by the experiencing subject, but is the implicit content of an
experience that can be pointed to by the phenomenologist. What
is disclosed in angst is the world as world, precisely because
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“the world can offer nothing more, nor can the Mitda-sein of others” (Heidegger 1996, 175[187]). What one feels (the phenomenon now open for study) is a breakdown in one’s usual directedness towards a particular object in the world, insofar as the
mood of angst is unable to find any joy or significance in the distraction of activity. Dasein feels entirely unable to go on. The
world itself becomes obtrusive.13 What is disclosed here is the
collapsed bridge, as it were, between Dasein's being and the
world, insofar as the world no longer is able to draw Dasein into
it.
Thus angst takes away from Da-sein the possibility of understanding itself, falling prey, in terms of the “world”
and the public way of being interpreted. It throws Dasein back upon that for which it is anxious, its authentic
potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. (Heidegger 1996, 1756[187])
But what is this essential bridge between being and world?
Precisely Dasein's ability to “project” itself upon possibilities of
being (Heidegger 1996, 136-139[145-149]). This “projection” is
disclosed in angst, precisely because Dasein could try to project
itself into an activity in the world but cannot. Thus, the independence of Dasein's projection is disclosed. Normally, Dasein is
so involved in the world that its possibilities are moot. In angst,
however, as in boredom (Heidegger 2008, 99), one is unprojected
and thus fully exposed to one’s being as dynamic potential. Also,
and most importantly, this individuates Dasein because it is concentrated on its own personal being-in-the-world. In despairing
its condition, Dasein is brought face-to-face with the kind of being that it is: a single individual. Thus, Heidegger writes:
Angst individualizes and thus discloses Dasein as “solus
ipse.” This existential “solipsism,” however, is so far from
transposing an isolated subject-thing into the harmless
vacuum of a worldless occurrence that it brings Da-sein
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in an extreme sense precisely before its world as world,
and thus itself before itself as being-in-the-world.
(Heidegger 1996, 176[188])
Dasein, in angst, feels itself as solus ipse, that is, as an “alone
self.” Heidegger calls this feeling existential solipsism. We cannot
understand this in the anachronistic sense of “aloneness of existence” inherited from existentialism, but rather in Heidegger's
qualified use of existential as referring to a structural component
of Dasein's existence rather than a particular mode of existing
within that structure (designated existentiell). This is evident
from the use of “discloses,” which means we are looking at the
phenomenological structure, not at Dasein's direct experience of
something akin to solipsism (Dreyfus, 177). If the world can no
longer provide one with comfort, one feels alone. Not only that,
but we can now distinguish individuality as an existential structure (Heidegger 1996, 122[130]).
This individuation lays the groundwork for authenticity.
Angst discloses Dasein's freedom to grasp itself authentically,
insofar as in the absence of tranquillization Dasein recognizes its
choice of possibilities.. This is not to say that Dasein necessarily
grasps itself as able to choose new possibilities for itself in a robust sense, but that it discloses to the phenomenologist that
Dasein has a way of determining these possibilities for itself. Let
us say, for instance, I have been swept into a job as a postal
worker by culture and circumstance. I then have a major psychological breakdown which I attribute to my job, so that I consider
changing my career. To the phenomenologist, this demonstrates
that a degree of freedom and the power of determinacy with regard to existentiell possibilities are part of Dasein's existential
structure. But I need not grasp this myself.
Lastly, angst discloses that Dasein's existence unheimlich
(uncanny), the etymological construction of which is not-athome. Insofar as attunement is an answer to “how one is,”
angst’s reply is “unheimlich.” Recall that angst is “nowhere” spatially and “nothing” content-wise. In analyzing Dasein's struc-
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ture, Heidegger pointed to the way we dwell “at home” in the
world when tranquilized by our activities.
Dasein is still in the world while it is feeling angst, it simply
loses its ability to find meaning within that world. Thus, all of
the structural components remain during angst, but Dasein cannot find relief in the world. Thus, Dasein is located in the world,
but does not feel it belongs.
Remember we are examining angst because it promises to
disclose the flight of Dasein from itself in an ontologically significant way rather than a merely ontically characterizing Dasein's
path of motion. But why choose this specific attunement? Heidegger writes:
It is true that it is the nature of every kind of attunement
to disclose complete being-in-the-world in all its constitutive factors (world, being-in, self). However, in Angst
there lies the possibility of a distinctive disclosure, since
Angst individualizes. This individualizing fetches Da-sein
back from its falling prey and reveals to it authenticity
and inauthenticity as possibilities of its being. The fundamental possibilities of Da-sein, which are always my
own, show themselves in Angst as they are, undistorted
by innerworldy beings to which Da-sein, initially and for
the most part, clings.14
The Grounding of Falling in Fleeing
So now we have shown that angst discloses Dasein’s structural individualism, dynamic potential for actualization through
possibilities offered by the world, and sense of fundamental uncanniness. But Heidegger's purpose here was to ground fleeing
in falling ontologically. Has the disclosure of angst accomplished
this?
The argument requires two movements. First, Heidegger
must demonstrate that the phenomenon of angst reveals falling
to be fleeing.15 Second, Heidegger must demonstrate that ordinary falling structurally is also fleeing, which he will do by argu-
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ing that angst is always present, whether felt or latent. The first is
simple and has been alluded to throughout. Heidegger writes:
...What falling prey, as flight, is fleeing from becomes
phenomenally visible. It is not a flight from innerworldly
beings, but precisely toward them as the beings among
which taking care of things, lost in the they [das Man], can
linger in tranquilized familiarity. Entangled flight into the
being-at-home of publicness is flight from not-being-athome, that is, from the uncanniness which lies in Da-sein
as thrown, as being-in-the-world entrusted to itself in its
being. (Heidegger 1996, 176-177[189])
This is readily apparent in the case of depression; what lifts
depression is taking one’s mind from the matter. This demonstrates a desire to flee the feeling of not being at home by feeling
at home again in the world. However, Heidegger immediately
makes the second move, by adding:
This uncanniness constantly pursues Da-sein and threatens his everyday lostness in the they [das Man], although
not explicitly. This threat can factically go along with
complete security and self-sufficiency of the everyday
way of taking care of things. Angst can arise in the most
harmless situations. (Heidegger 1996, 177[189])
But what does Heidegger mean by this? Does Heidegger imply that the desire to flee from angst is a psychological motivation
underlying all human behavior?
Here are the claims Heidegger makes. First, he writes: “If we
interpret the uncanniness of Da-sein existentially and ontologically as a threat which concerns Da-sein itself and which comes
from itself, we are not asserting that uncanniness has always already understood in factical Angst in this sense” (Heidegger
1996, 177[189]). Heidegger is making interpretive claims about
the meaning of Da-sein's uncanniness instead of implying this to
be the way Dasein interprets its angst. Rather, “The everyday-
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ness way in which Da-sein understands uncanniness is the entangled turning away which “phases out” not-being-athome” (Heidegger 1996, 177[189]). In fact, Dasein does not interpret its angst as anything, because it reflexively “phases out” its
angst by turning away. This reflex betrays Dasein’s understanding, that which is non-thematically, non-interpretively disclosed to
Dasein as definite possibilities. Also, recall that “attunement always has its understanding, even if only by suppressing it. Understanding is always attuned” (Heidegger 1996, 134[142-43]).
This means that because angst is a possible attunement in the
mode of everydayness, every other attunement of everydayness is
in effect suppressed angst as well. Heidegger believes this to be
sufficient ground for asserting it as being the case.
The everydayness of this fleeing, however, shows phenomenally that Angst as a fundamental kind of attunement belongs to the essential constitution of Da-sein in
being-in-the-world which, as an existential one, is never
objectively present, but is itself always in the mode of factical Da-sein, that is, in the mode of attunement. Tranquilized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Da-sein, not the other way around. (Heidegger
1996, 177[189])
Think of the actual attunement of angst as a magnification of
the being of Dasein within which we get to see the moment that
Dasein turns from itself into the world. We see that the alternative
to everydayness is something that Dasein wishes to avoid, and
which can arise at any time. We see that Dasein avoids this by
fleeing into the world. Also, fleeing into the world is characteristic
of all of Dasein's inauthentic behavior. Thus, we can conclude that
any time inauthentic Dasein is not fleeing, Dasein is experiencing
angst. We can conclude that if Dasein were not involved in the
world, Dasein would experience itself as uncanny.
The juxtaposition itself is not enough to justify the privileging
of uncanniness, yet Heidegger insists that “Not-being-at-home
must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more pri-
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mordial phenomenon” (Heidegger 1996, 177[189]). This is why
attunement is such an important method for Heidegger, because
it can let us draw things that are normally disclosed as merely
possible in understanding close by circumspection. Therefore, we
can establish that uncanniness so far from signifying the opposite
of the “falling” of everyday being-in-the-world, is premised and
reliant upon the negation of it. We know this because involvement as negated angst is a phenomenon in which uncanniness is
disclosed. “Da-sein is anxious in the very ground of its being” (Heidegger 1996, 177[190]). Its typical negation despite its
fundamentality explains the rarity of real angst.
Its possibility is most explicitly grasped when we get bored
or restless due to the threat of losing all interest in anything. All
of this demonstrates that we flee into the world away from ourselves, because involvement is fundamentally a reaction to the
possibility of feeling that we are not quite at home here; that is,
we struggle to fit in because at our core we do not feel like we fit
in.
On the grounds of this analysis, Heidegger defines the being
of everyday Dasein as Sorge. In German this means “worry,” although it is translated as “care” because it should be taken to
have a neutral connotation. Heidegger views the play between
the angst of not being absorbed in the world and the “worry”
that maintains Dasein's connection to the world as both natural
and ineluctable.
Conclusion
Thus, Heidegger does not declare that angst is latent to posit
it as a motivational or psychological justification of falling. Although the meaning of falling is fleeing, this simply means that
phenomenology discloses that when Dasein feels angst, it comes
face to face with itself and the feeling that it in no way feels at
home in the world. Insofar as angst is negated by the tranquillization of turning towards the world, as long as Dasein remains
absorbed in the world, angst does not threaten it. Dasein must be
circumspectly leery of the fact that it could face its uncanniness
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at any given time, although as long as Dasein cares about things
in the world, the uncanniness subsides because it no longer
comes before itself as an individual out of place in the world.
Rather than being a motivational or psychological account, Heidegger’s account of angst treats it as something that Dasein
brings with it to the world. It is inevitable, but since it is dealt
with most of the time, its status is not thematically clear in Heidegger’s work.
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Notes

1. See (e.g.) Magda King, A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 92.
2. See Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World (Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1991), 35-38; 226-29; cf. Leslie MacAvoy, “Overturning
Cartesianism and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Rethinking
Dreyfus on Heidegger” Inquiry 44 (4): 455-80 (2001); Matheson Russell, “Is There a 'Hermeneutics of Suspicion' in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit?” Inquiry 51 (1): 97-118 (2007).
3. References to German page numbers given in brackets.
4. Cf. (Kierkegaard, 14[IV 296-7]).
5. See Richard Schmitt, Martin Heidegger on Being Human
(Gloucester: Random House, 1976), 152-165.
6. See Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,
trans. Albert Hofstadter (Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1982), 15-23.
7. See (Heidegger 1996, 107-22[113-31]; 73-74[78-80]); cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp
Smith (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1929), 151-60[B12940]; 197-201[B202-8].
8. Circumspection [umsehen] refers to what is understood but
not interpreted, such as what is known by a person who can
pick up a hammer and swing it without any kind of training,
but also to what is implicitly understood without explication
in general.
9. E.g., through the “idle chatter” of das Man. Cf. (Heidegger,
157-59[167-71]).
10. It has been suggested that the rarity of angst makes empathizing with the feeling difficult (King, 93).
11. This is sometimes translated as “anxiety,” which is misleading because “anxiety” fits the colloquial use of Sorge (Care)
better than it does Heidegger's terminological usage of die
Angst. “Angst” literally means “fear.” One might say, “Ich
habe Angst für Spinnen,” which would literally be “I have fear
for spiders.” This is why Heidegger is careful to distinguish
Angst from the phenomenon of fear [Furcht], following
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12.

13.

14.
15.

Colin Bodayle
Kierkegaard's usage of Angst in Danish. The sense of “angst”
used in “teen angst” in English has its etymological roots in
early translations of existentialism. The German use of Angst
for the medical condition of anxiety is etymologically rooted
in English's concept of existential angst, making it a double
loanword. See Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Angst.
William Blattner rightly connects angst with depression. It
should be noted, however, that Heidegger distinguishes the
ontological (phenomenological) description of angst from the
physiological description, the condition for the possibility of
which is that “Da-sein is anxious in the very ground of its
being” (Blattner, 141-42) & (Heidegger 1996, 177[189-90].
See Dreyfus’s Sein und Zeit, 177. Dreyfus points to the usage
of the verb aufdrängen on page 187 of Sein und Zeit, which he
believes refers back to the word Aufdringlichkeit on page 73,
which comprises a major part of his reading of Heidegger. It
must be maintained that like in the breakdown of equipment,
what is disclosed is not cognized in the experience or
revealed to Dasein in the experience, as Dreyfus correctly
points out. However, it is not that socially articulated norms
become revealed or disclosed as a conspiracy and
falsification, but that one cannot draw pleasure from them.
See (Heidegger 1996, 178[190-91]); cf. (Dreyfus, 180); and
(Blattner, 139).
That is, shows the meaning of this falling to be Dasein running away from itself.
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